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Justice Scalia and the Religion Clauses: A Comment 
on Professor Epps 
Eric R. Claeys* 
In his Article Some Animals Are More Equal than Others,1 
Professor Garrett Epps has made an important analytical contribution 
to the scholarship on the Religion Clauses. Epps persuasively shows 
that Justice Antonin Scalia exerted substantial influence on the 
religion cases decided by the Supreme Court’s five-vote moderate-to-
conservative majority. Epps makes a particularly novel insight when 
he suggests that Scalia developed a rhetoric of neutrality and equality 
to roll back anti-establishment case law. Epps identifies features of 
Scalia’s religion opinions that accord with more general and 
surprising tendencies in Scalia’s jurisprudence. Epps’s portrait 
confirms that Scalia is a partial originalist; he justifies “majority 
rules” results not only with originalism, but also with theories of 
judicial restraint and moral positivism that entitle democratic 
majorities to make important policy choices.  
At the same time, observers who do not embrace Professor Epps’ 
substantive views about law and religion need not agree with his 
conclusions. Analytically, I am concerned that Professor Epps 
overstates his contribution. His interpretation casts Justice Scalia as 
the field general of the Rehnquist Court’s moderate-to-conservative 
bloc. He also suggests that the other moderates and conservatives act 
as “his troops,”—note the “his”—ready to “storm the next walled city 
of separation.”2 I believe the other Justices are capable of acting for 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Saint Louis University. I thank Neil Richards and the 
editors of the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy for inviting me to participate in 
this symposium, Garrett Epps for writing an insightful and provocative article, Steve Smith, 
Rick Garnett, Roger Goldman, and Mark Rosen for helpful comments, and David Mannix for 
helpful research assistance.  
 1. Garrett Epps, Some Animals Are More Equal than Others: The Rehnquist Court and 
“Majority Religion,” 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 323 (2006). 
 2. Id. at 326. 
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themselves and have sided with Scalia’s equality/neutrality theory 
only when and to the extent that it happened to dovetail with their 
own agendas. Normatively, I must respectfully part ways with Epps 
when he turns from interpretation to critical evaluation. Although he 
does not lay out his normative priors fully, Epps critiques the cases as 
strong separationists do. By contrast, I follow original-meaning 
principles in constitutional interpretation, and I also believe that the 
original meanings of the Religion Clauses are quite defensible on 
their substantive merits. In this Comment, I hope to identify the areas 
in which Professor Epps makes novel and important insights, and the 
areas in which originalists and religionists will disagree with how he 
evaluates those insights. 
I. A RELIGIONIST’S HISTORY OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 
An old saying goes: “Where you stand depends on where you sit.” 
Readers who want to sort out the valuable and the controversial in 
Professor Epps’ Article need to first know where he and I both sit. 
Epps leans toward the “separationist” side of the Religion Clauses 
debate, which construes the First Amendment generally “to prohibit 
any governmental support of religion.”3 While Epps assumes his 
priors more than he states them, he appeals to separationists in the 
audience when he says, when speaking of the division between 
church and state, “[F]or old time’s sake, let us call it a ‘wall of 
separation.’”4 He places high value on ensuring that members of 
minority religions do not feel stigmatized.5 He concludes his Article 
by arguing that “religious ill will” ensues when political groups 
appeal to religion in politics.6 If one reads the cases with these priors, 
the Religion Clauses case law peaked during the middle of the 
Warren Court and has become more depressing ever since. That 
mood more or less informs Professor Epps’ interpretation of the 
cases.  
 
 3. Robert L. Cord & Howard Ball, The Meaning of Church and State: A Debate, 1987 
UTAH L. REV. 895, 920.  
 4. Epps, supra note 1, at 326. 
 5. Epps, supra note 1. 
 6. Id. at 346. 
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By contrast, I approach the cases as a “religionist” and an 
originalist. As a religionist, I believe that government has good 
reasons to rely on religious groups and to promote respect for 
organized religion when discharging its general duties.7 As an 
originalist, I read the historical record to confirm that the Religion 
Clauses’ original public meanings allow governments to do so. While 
I cannot give a comprehensive account of the Religion Clauses here, 
the following account accords in substantial respects with the portrait 
painted in recent surveys of the development of Religion Clause 
doctrine by Philip Hamburger8 and Noah Feldman.9 For originalists, 
this account is relevant for understanding the original public 
meanings of the Religion Clauses. Non-originalists may want to 
consider the political theory reflected in this history, the early 
Enlightenment/classical-liberal theory of religious toleration evident 
in the writings of John Locke10 and Alexis de Tocqueville,11 and the 
public speeches and acts of many of America’s founders.12  
At the Founding, many authorities assumed that the Religion 
Clauses left Congress and the states considerable leeway to promote 
religious belief. Many assumed that the term “establishment” in the 
 
 7. Cf. Edmund N. Santurri, Religion, the Constitution, and Rawlsian Justice: A Critical 
Analysis of David A.J. Richards on the Religion Clauses, 9 J.L. & RELIGION 325, 326 (1992) 
(reviewing DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986)). 
 8. PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002). 
 9. NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA’S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM—AND 
WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT (1st ed. 2005). To be sure, Feldman’s account differs from 
Hamburger’s in important particulars. On one hand, Feldman criticizes Hamburger’s account 
for not sufficiently emphasizing how liberty of conscience and religious plurality propelled the 
anti-establishment movement at the Founding, see id. at 26; on the other, he insists that mid-
twentieth-century legal secularism was informed more by non-religious political liberalism and 
less by Protestant nativism than Hamburger’s account suggests, see id. at 278 n.46. Even so, the 
two accounts are closer to one another than the conventional “wall of separation” account that 
informs Professor Epps’ Article and most contemporary religion constitutional law and 
scholarship.  
 10. See JOHN LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, reprinted in TREATISE OF CIVIL 
GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 168 (Charles L. Sherman ed., 
Irvington Press 1979) (1689); see also JOHN LOCKE, THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY 
(Douglas C. Macintosh ed., C. Scribner’s Sons 1925) (1695).  
 11. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA I.ii.9 (Harvey C. Mansfield 
& Delba Winthrop trans. & eds., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1835). 
 12. On which, consider 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 43–111 (Philip B. Kurland & 
Ralph Lerner eds., 1987), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/tocs/amendI_ 
religion.html. 
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Establishment Clause referred to one of two things: a legislative act 
designating a single church as the sole state-approved sect, or state 
funding of church ministers, churches, and church property.13 Many 
believed that the term “free exercise” in the Free Exercise Clause 
referred to the freedom to worship publicly and peacefully in one’s 
chosen church or sect without physical or legal interference.14 For 
example, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 declared that “all 
men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God 
according to the dictates over their own consciences and 
understanding,” to be free from being “compelled to attend any 
religious worship,” and to be free from being compelled to “erect or 
support any place of worship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to, 
or against, his own free will and consent.”15 “Free exercise” 
economically referred to the first two rights, while freedom from 
“establishment” economically referred to the third. 
For those who understood “establishment” and “free exercise” as 
such precise terms of art, the First Amendment left considerable 
leeway for state and federal governments to promote religion and 
morality. Because the First Amendment bars Congress from “making 
any law respecting” any establishment or “prohibiting” free exercise, 
it leaves alone state establishments or non-establishments and state 
regulation of religious exercise.16 Separately, when Congress 
properly exercises federal jurisdiction—say, in the U.S. capitol or in 
federal territories—the Religion Clauses leave Congress free to pass 
laws and the President free to use his bully pulpit to promote religion 
and religious morality in many ways that fall short of establishing a 
 
 13. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 8, at 89–107; Michael W. McConnell, 
Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105 (2003); Douglas G. Smith, The Establishment Clause: Corollary of 
Eighteenth-Century Corporate Law?, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 239 (2003). But see LEONARD W. 
LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 94–111 (2d ed., 
rev. 1994). 
 14. See, e.g., Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Exemption: An Historical 
Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 933–36 (1992). But see Michael W. McConnell, The 
Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 
(1990). 
 15. PA. CONST. of 1776, Decl. of Rts. art. II (1776). 
 16. See STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 18–22 (1995); Steven D. Smith, The Jurisdictional 
Establishment Clause: A Reappraisal, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2006). 
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U.S. church or coercing or limiting peaceable public worship. Thus, 
in 1787, the Articles Congress passed the Northwest Ordinance, 
which, in the process of providing for the government of the 
Northwest Territory, specified: “Religion, morality, and knowledge, 
being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, 
schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.”17 
The first Congress referred the First Amendment to the states, but it 
also ratified and effectively reenacted these provisions of the 
Northwest Ordinance.18 During the first Congress, the U.S. House of 
Representatives also called for a national day of prayer and 
thanksgiving—the day after it passed the First Amendment.19 In 
1789, President Washington issued a proclamation to “recommend 
and assign Thursday the 26th day of November next to be devoted by 
the people of these States to the service of that great and glorious 
Being, who is the beneficent Author of all the good that was, that is, 
or that will be.”20  
Similarly, many understood the Free Exercise Clause to leave 
Congress free to pass general regulations that limited individual 
conduct in order to uphold the public health, safety, and morals. So 
understood, citizens could not cite the amendment to claim an 
exemption from such regulations for religious conscience. Thus, the 
New York Constitution provided:  
[F]ree exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and 
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever 
hereafter be allowed, within this State, to all mankind: 
Provided, That the liberty of conscience, hereby granted, shall 
not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or 
justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this 
State.21  
 
 17. NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, art. 3 (1787), available at www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/ 
nworder.htm.  
 18. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 
1789–1801, at 106, 112–13 (1997). 
 19. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 948, 949–50 (Joseph Gales & William Winston Seaton eds., 
1789). 
 20. George Washington, Thanksgiving Proclamation (Oct. 3, 1789), available at 
http://gwpapers.virginia.edu/documents/thanksgiving/transcript.html. 
 21. N.Y. CONST. art. 38 (1777); accord MASS. CONST., Decl. of Rts. art. II (1780), 
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These documents promote a theory of religious toleration 
substantially different from the “wall of separation” theory that 
informs Epps’ Article and much contemporary scholarship. 
According to Michael Novak’s analogy, reason and revelation are 
“two wings” supporting the same understanding of truth and 
morals.22 In his farewell address, George Washington called religion 
and morality “indispensable supports” for a government dedicated to 
securing natural rights.23  
By the same token, while political society needs religion and is 
obligated to respect it, religion is also judged under the standards 
prescribed by natural law and natural rights. As Locke put it, in the 
good life “lies the safety both of men’s souls and of the 
commonwealth…. Moral actions belong therefore to the jurisdiction 
both of the inward and outward court . . . both of the magistrate and 
the conscience.”24  
The U.S. Supreme Court followed this understanding in Reynolds 
v. United States, an 1878 case that rejected a free-exercise challenge 
to an anti-polygamy law in the federal territories.25 The Court 
assumed that free-exercise principles left Congress free to use its 
territorial police powers “to reach actions which were in violation of 
social duties or subversive of good order,”26 and noted that to hold 
otherwise “would be to make the professed doctrines of religious 
belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every 
citizen to become a law unto himself.”27 As one of several 
corollaries, Locke and leading Americans assumed that government 
could discriminate among different religious sects depending on 
whether a particular sect’s practices were consistent with the 
 
available at http://www.founding.com/library/1body.cfm=478&parent=475 (“[N]o subject shall 
be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or estate, for worshipping GOD in the 
manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; or for his religious 
profession or sentiments; provided he doth not disturb the public peace, or obstruct others in 
their religious worship.”). 
 22. MICHAEL NOVAK, ON TWO WINGS: HUMBLE FAITH AND COMMON SENSE AT THE 
AMERICAN FOUNDING (1st ed. 2002). 
 23. George Washington, Farewell Address, in GEORGE WASHINGTON: A COLLECTION 
521 (W.B. Allen ed., 1988). 
 24. LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, supra note 10, at 206. 
 25. 98 U.S. 145 (1879). 
 26. Id. at 164. 
 27. Id. at 167. 
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requirements of republican government. The Justices who decided 
Reynolds understood that polygamy laws were supported by the 
religious beliefs of some Mormons. Locke excluded Catholics and 
Muslims of the time from the commonwealth, because those sects’ 
doctrines then required believers “ipso facto [to] deliver themselves 
up to the protection and service of another prince.”28 As President, 
George Washington noted that Jews had more religious liberty in the 
United States than elsewhere,29 but he also suggested politely to 
Quakers that they shirked republican duties by refusing to serve in 
the military because of religious objections to war.30 
Of course, one must be careful not to attribute this general 
understanding to everyone who lived at the Founding or thereafter. 
As Steven Smith suggested, different actors and religious groups had 
different attitudes, ranging from the fairly “traditional” position just 
described, to the “voluntarist,” and perhaps even “heretical,” 
positions of Jefferson, Madison, and other more separationist-minded 
actors.31 Even so, what Smith calls the “traditional” view continued 
to influence public-morals regulation substantially, even if it did not 
shape conventional wisdom dispositively.32 Moreover, many of the 
dissenters respected the traditional view in their public speeches and 
actions. For example, the same Thomas Jefferson who authored the 
“wall of separation” letter to the Danbury Baptists also asserted in his 
first presidential inaugural that Americans were  
enlightened by a benign religion, professed, indeed, and 
practiced in various forms, yet all of them inculcating honesty, 
 
 28. LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, supra note 10, at 208–09, 212. Note that the 
Catholic Church’s current teaching differs substantially from the views Locke attributed to 
Catholics in his day. See Pope Paul VI, Declaration on Religious Freedom: On the Right of the 
Person and of Communities to Social and Civil Freedom in Matters Religious, in THE 
DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 675 (Walter M. Abbott ed. & Joseph Gallagher trans., 1966); see 
also JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE 
AMERICAN PROPOSITION (1960).  
 29. George Washington, Letter to the Hebrew Congregation in Newport, Rhode Island 
(Aug. 18, 1790), reprinted in 6 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 284 (Dorothy Twohig 
ed., 1996). 
 30. George Washington, Letter to the Society of Quakers (Oct. 1789), reprinted in 4 THE 
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 29, at 265. 
 31. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 16, at 19–21.  
 32. Id. at 19–20. 
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truth, temperance, gratitude, and the love of man; 
acknowledging and adoring an overruling Providence, which 
by all its dispensations proves that it delights in the happiness 
of man here and his greater happiness hereafter.33 
Similarly, on the same day that James Madison introduced Virginia’s 
Statute for Religious Freedom, he also sponsored a bill (drafted by 
Jefferson) to punish Sabbath breakers.34 
This religionist consensus influenced American law and policy for 
at least a century.35 It was first attacked openly and on a wide-ranging 
basis in the second half of the nineteenth century by thinkers that 
Noah Feldman has generally described as “secularists.”36 In the 
1860s and 1870s, leading academics worried that “interference with 
science in the supposed interest of religion . . . has resulted in the 
direst evils both to religion and to science,” while “all untrammeled 
scientific investigation . . . has invariably resulted in the highest good 
both of religion and of science.”37 A couple of decades later, such 
academic doubts burgeoned into a broader political movement, the 
 
 33. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address at Washington, D.C. (Mar. 4, 1801), in 
INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE UNITED STATES FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON 1789 TO 
RICHARD MILHOUSE NIXON 1973, at 13, 15 (1974). Separately, Daniel L. Dreisbach has 
questioned whether Jefferson’s Danbury letter confirms its standard separationist reading in his 
book, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 25–
54 (2002). 
 34. See 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 555–56 (J.P. Boyd ed., 1950). 
 35. I assume in this Comment that the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
affect any of the issues discussed in connection with the First Amendment, for two separate 
reasons. First, by following this assumption, I stay within most of the contemporary case law 
and scholarship, which holds that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause incorporates 
the requirements of the First Amendment Religion Clauses. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 
577, 620 n.4 (1992); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1947). Second, even though I 
doubt that the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights, 
these doubts probably do not make a legal difference on state religion issues. The Fourteenth 
Amendment may limit state actions respecting religion, if the rights to free exercise or freedom 
from establishment count as “privileges” or “immunities” covered by the Fourteenth 
Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause. If  religious rights do not count as “privileges” or 
“immunities,” the federal courts should stay out of local religion disputes even more completely 
than this Comment argues. If religious rights are constitutional privileges or immunities, I 
assume that these “privileges” and “immunities” are not substantially broader than the freedoms 
protected by the First Amendment as described in the text of this Comment. 
 36. FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 113–34. 
 37. ANDREW DICKSON WHITE, THE WARFARE OF SCIENCE viii (1876), quoted in 
FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 116. 
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“Liberals,” who campaigned for state and federal constitutional 
amendments guaranteeing a separation of church and state.38 As 
Philip Hamburger recounted, some of these campaigns succeeded at 
the state level in the passage of Blaine Amendments barring state 
support of religious education.39 However, the Liberal movement 
failed to the extent that it sought ratification of a national 
constitutional amendment “to accomplish the total separation of 
Church and State” by barring Congress from “favoring any particular 
form of religion.”40  
Yet even if nineteenth-century Liberals failed politically, they 
succeeded culturally by leaving ideas about the “wall of separation” 
and “religious divisiveness” as memes in twentieth-century social and 
political thought. By the 1930s and 1940s, there existed a broad 
segment of Americans, especially if not exclusively university-
educated Americans, who generally agreed that religion should be 
kept suitably separate from public education and public debate.41 This 
shift marks the turn to what Feldman calls “legal secularism,” which I 
will call the “separationism” that Epps assumes as a baseline for 
analysis and argument in his Article.42 Liberals and their successors 
gradually turned away from campaigning for a constitutional 
amendment to litigating to change the way that courts construed the 
Religion Clauses, particularly the Establishment Clause.43  
When the U.S. Supreme Court became involved, it embraced 
separationism. In the 1940s, in Everson v. Board of Education44 and 
McCollum v. Board of Education,45 Court majorities announced that 
the “First Amendment has erected a wall between Church and State 
 
 38. See generally HAMBURGER, supra note 8, at 287–333. 
 39. See id. at 322–28, 335. 
 40. EQUAL RIGHTS IN RELIGION: REPORT OF THE CENTENNIAL CONGRESS OF LIBERALS 
12, 21 (1876), quoted in HAMBURGER, supra note 8, at 296.  
 41. One can see leading religionist public intellectuals confronting this separationist 
school of thought in a 1949 Law and Contemporary Problems symposium dedicated to the 
Supreme Court’s first major religion cases. See, e.g., John Courtney Murray, Law or 
Prepossessions?, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 34 (1949) (noting “the existence of a 
powerful and articulate philosophy of ‘American’ education in whose explicit tendency is the 
denial or diminishing of the juridical status of [parochial] schools”). 
 42. See FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 150–85. 
 43. See HAMBURGER, supra note 8, at 334–59. 
 44. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 45. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
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which must be kept high and impregnable,” on the “premise that both 
religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if 
each is left free from the other within its respective sphere.”46 A 
substantial Court minority pressed further to suggest that government 
invites “divisiveness” when it injects religion into public affairs. For 
example, Justice Frankfurter concurred separately in McCollum to 
suggest that “[t]he preservation of the community from divisive 
conflicts, of Government from irreconcilable pressures by religious 
groups, of religion from censorship and coercion however subtly 
exercised, requires strict confinement of the State to instruction other 
than religious.”47  
However, the post-New Deal Court has been inconsistent in how 
it has embraced these claims about “divisiveness” and the “wall of 
separation.” Everson and McCollum took a historical approach, citing 
Madison and Jefferson for the original meanings and intentions of the 
Religion Clauses.48 Other opinions instead took a “living 
Constitution” approach. For example, in his concurrence in the 1963 
decision of Abington School District v. Schempp, Justice Brennan 
acknowledged that the Founders promoted religion in many ways, but 
adopted a more “purposive”49 and “living Constitution”50 approach to 
conclude that twentieth-century case law should embrace religious 
neutrality.  
The case law reached some sort of equipoise during the Burger 
Court.51 While many of the cases were controversial, the law neither 
tilted sharply back toward the Founders’ traditional approach nor 
forward toward a more purified version of legal secularism.52 Late in 
the Burger Court, however, judicial conservatives started to question 
 
 46. Id. at 212. 
 47. Id. at 217 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 48. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 8–16; see also McCollum, 333 U.S. at 211 (citing Everson, 
330 U.S. at 15–16). 
 49. See 374 U.S. 203, 241 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[O]ur use of the history of 
[Jefferson and Madison’s] time must limit itself to broad purposes, not specific practices.”). 
 50. See id. (“[O]ur interpretation of the First Amendment must necessarily be responsive 
to the much more highly charged nature of religious questions in contemporary society.”). 
 51. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 52. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, in THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 115 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992); Michael W. 
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1. 
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the Burger Court’s compromises and even to challenge Everson and 
McCollum. Evangelical Protestants and traditionalist Catholics 
became more politically active in the 1970s and 1980s in response to 
cultural debates about abortion, religion, sexual equality and other 
issues.53 From among these religious conservatives emerged religious 
academics who questioned important tenets of separationism. Robert 
Cord, for example, authored a prominent study attacking Everson and 
McCollum’s rendition of history; he concluded that the Founders 
generally intended to promote religion as long as it was done non-
preferentially.54 These developments, in turn, encouraged then-
Associate Justice William Rehnquist to question much of the Court’s 
Establishment Clause case law in a dissenting opinion in the 1985 
case of Wallace v. Jaffree.55 The question at the beginning of the 
Rehnquist Court was whether Rehnquist could find enough current 
allies and new nominees to question religion law more openly. 
II. JUSTICE SCALIA’S POSITIVIST THEORY OF EQUALITY 
With that contrast in mind, Professor Epps’ most important 
contributions are these: the Rehnquist Court did veer to some extent 
from the most extreme separationist claims one sees in Everson, 
McCollum, and subsequent precedent; and, when the Court did 
retrench, it did so in part due to the influence of Justice Scalia’s 
positivist theory of religious group equality. As Epps recounts, in 
Scalia’s dissent in the 1992 opinion of Lee v. Weisman, he assumed 
in a school-prayer case that there was no middle ground between 
“frustrating th[e] desire of a religious majority” and “imposing 
‘psychological coercion,’ or a feeling of exclusion, upon 
nonbelievers.”56  
 
 53. See, e.g., DONALD T. CRITCHLOW, PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY AND GRASSROOTS 
CONSERVATISM: A WOMAN’S CRUSADE 261–69 (2005).  
 54. See ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND 
CURRENT FICTION xiv (1982). Not all religion scholars, however, regard Cord’s book as 
“scholarship,” as the text assumes. See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 13, at 261 (referring to Cord’s 
work as “[m]ostly historical fiction masquerading as scholarship”). 
 55. 472 U.S. 38, 91–114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see id. at 104 (citing CORD, 
supra note 54). 
 56. Epps, supra note 1, at 331. 
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Such all-or-nothing logic helps explain why, over the next decade, 
the Court upheld a government commission’s decision to allow the 
public display of a cross on equal time with other similar displays by 
a private party in Pinette;57 a state university’s decision to support a 
sectarian college paper on equal time with other campus newspapers 
in Rosenberger;58 states’ decisions to support a sectarian school on 
equal terms with non-sectarian schools in Mitchell v. Helms;59 and 
vouchers to sectarian schools on equal terms with non-sectarian 
schools in Zelman.60 Because Justice Scalia’s theory of religious 
group equality was so effective in these cases, Epps worries that it is 
ominous that last term Scalia abandoned all pretenses of religious 
equality in McCreary and touted instead “a key governmental role for 
certain religious beliefs designated as ‘traditional’ or ‘majority’ 
beliefs.”61  
Epps’ interpretation is important. Justice Scalia is an eloquent 
defender of originalism,62 and most Court-watchers assume that he is 
a diehard originalist. In practice, however, Scalia is only a partial 
originalist (in his words, a “faint-hearted originalist”),63 and it is only 
recently that scholars such as myself,64 Ralph Rossum,65 and Randy 
Barnett66 have explored the limits of his originalism. While Justice 
Scalia is committed to the Constitution’s original meaning, two 
factors often either compete with his commitment to or influence how 
he understands original meaning. One is Justice Scalia’s belief in 
 
 57. Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995). 
 58. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 59. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
 60. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 61. Epps, supra note 1, at 341; see McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005). 
 62. See ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 63. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989). 
 64. See Eric R. Claeys, Raich and Judicial Conservatism at the Close of the Rehnquist 
Court, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 791, 801–15 (2005) [hereinafter Claeys, Raich and Judicial 
Conservatism] ; Eric R. Claeys, Takings and Private Property on the Rehnquist Court, 99 NW. 
U. L. REV. 187, 222–29 (2004) [hereinafter Claeys, Takings]. 
 65. See Ralph A. Rossum, The Textualist Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia, in HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 787, 792–93 (Bryan-Paul Frost & Jeffrey Sikkenga eds., 
2003). 
 66. See Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 
74 U. CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=880112). 
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judicial restraint. Scalia prefers originalism in large part because “the 
legislature would seem a much more appropriate expositor of social 
values” than unelected courts.67 This argument raises questions as to 
whether Scalia prefers originalism primarily as an end of its own or 
as a means to restrain judges’ policy-making discretion.68 The other 
factor consists of the moral language that Scalia often uses to 
describe the policy choices that the constitutional text raises. Many of 
the Constitution’s individual-rights provisions are informed by 
background ideas of natural law and rights; Scalia often describes the 
policy choices raised by those provisions in flatter, positivist terms as 
value choices that majorities are entitled to make.69 
Professor Epps’ interpretation of Scalia’s opinions in religion 
cases fits this pattern, with some qualifications. Substantively, the 
Religion Clauses do not force Justice Scalia to make hard choices 
between originalism and judicial restraint. The original meanings of 
both clauses are far narrower and rule-oriented than most of the 
government practices that trigger constitutional religion litigation 
today. Even so, it is still worth noting that in Religion Clause cases, 
Scalia defended the rules he favored largely in terms of judicial 
restraint and majoritarianism. For example, as Epps recounts,70 in the 
climactic passage of Smith, Scalia argues: 
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the 
political process will place at a relative disadvantage those 
religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that 
unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be 
preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto 
itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all 
laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.71 
 
 67. Scalia, supra note 63, at 854. 
 68. See, e.g., Claeys, Raich and Judicial Conservatism, supra note 64, at 810–11, 814–15 
(describing how Justice Scalia recasts the original meanings of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
and section five of the Fourteenth Amendment to conform to a theory of judicial restraint).  
 69. See, e.g., Claeys, Takings, supra note 64, at 222–29 (describing how Justice Scalia 
explains the substantive issues raised in regulatory-takings cases in positivist terms). 
 70. See Epps, supra note 1, at 331–32. 
 71. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). 
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Scalia framed the competing policy interests as a value balance, and 
placed high priority on the policy interest against judges interfering 
with democratic policy choices.  
 Similarly, as Epps also recounts,72 in his Weisman dissent, Scalia 
framed the issue as follows: 
The issue before us today is not the abstract philosophical 
question whether the alternative of frustrating this desire of a 
religious majority is to be preferred over the alternative of 
imposing “psychological coercion,” or a feeling of exclusion, 
upon nonbelievers. Rather, the question is whether a 
mandatory choice in favor of the former has been imposed by 
the United States Constitution.73 
In Weisman, Scalia showed that he was entirely familiar with the 
Founders’ attitudes toward religion, as discussed above. Immediately 
after the above-quoted passage, Scalia argued that the Founders 
“knew that nothing, absolutely nothing, is so inclined to foster among 
religious believers of various faiths a toleration—no, an affection—
for one another than voluntarily joining in prayer together, to the God 
whom they all worship and seek,” and criticized the majority for 
“depriv[ing] our society of that important unifying mechanism.”74 
Even so, in the passage he chose to italicize to highlight his criticism, 
Scalia stressed that the Court majority had religious majorities and 
religious dissenters. 
As will become clear, the results that Scalia defended in these 
cases deserve more consideration than Epps gives them, for they 
fairly approximate the original meanings of the Religion Clauses. 
Even so, Epps has performed a useful service by showing how, in the 
religion cases as elsewhere, theories of judicial restraint and 
majoritarian positivism reinforced Scalia’s originalist conclusion. 
 
 72. Epps, supra note 1, at 331–32. 
 73. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 646 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 74. Id.  
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III. JUSTICE SCALIA’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE MODERATE-TO-
CONSERVATIVE MAJORITY 
At the same time, it is important not to blow Justice Scalia’s views 
or the Rehnquist Court’s legacy out of proportion. I appreciate 
Professor Epps’ perspective. If one thinks that Everson, McCollum, 
and Schempp got the broad principles correct, the last thirty years are 
probably depressing, and the last fifteen must be positively 
alarming.75 But the perspective changes if one zooms out of the sixty-
year range and into the 200-year range, as I do. From my vantage 
point, the Rehnquist Court’s religion docket still seems depressing, 
but it seems so because it was a wasted opportunity. The Rehnquist 
Court did not significantly roll back the separationist trends in 
Establishment Clause law, and Epps’ portrait makes Justice Scalia 
seem more influential than he really was. 
Let me start with the skepticism that the Rehnquist Court’s work 
was significant. From the 200-year view, the Rehnquist Court’s five-
vote moderate-to-conservative majority made substantial changes in 
Free Exercise law, but not in Establishment Clause law. In 
Employment Division v. Smith,76 the Court significantly limited 
Warren and Burger Court Free Exercise precedents that recognized a 
right of religious conscientious objection from generally applicable 
laws. Sherbert v. Verner77 and subsequent cases had suggested that 
governments must satisfy strict scrutiny whenever their policies 
substantially burden practices informed by legitimate religious 
beliefs.78 Smith then held that the Free Exercise Clause does not 
require governments to ameliorate religious burdens created by 
generally applicable regulations.79 Of course, the Court then limited 
 
 75. Indeed, Professor Epps is not the first to be so appalled. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, 
Religion and the Rehnquist Court, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 145 (2004); Norman Redlich, The 
Religion Clauses: A Study in Confusion, in THE REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON 
THE RIGHT 99 (Herman Schwartz ed., 2002). 
 76. Smith, 494 U.S. 872. 
 77. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 78. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); Thomas v. Review Bd., 
450 U.S. 707, 717–19 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214–15 (1972); Sherbert, 374 
U.S. at 403–06. 
 79. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–85. The Court’s opinion could also be read to limit the 
Sherbert line of cases to exclude only generally-applicable criminal laws. See id. at 884. 
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Smith in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, in 
which it invalidated a local prohibition on ritual animal slaughter on 
the ground that the anti-slaughter law singled out the religious 
practices of Santerians.80 Even so, Smith restored Reynolds and the 
Free Exercise Clause’s original meaning to a significant extent.  
The Court’s five-vote moderate-to-conservative majority also 
made Establishment Clause law significantly more originalist in one 
line of cases, which generally gave governments more leeway to 
provide financial and other aid to religious institutions to promote 
general non-religious policies.81 The most important case in this line 
was Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, which upheld a voucher program 
that allowed parents to use government vouchers to pay for parochial 
schools.82 The Court also slightly limited Warren and Burger Court 
precedents that restricted the displays of religious symbols in 1989 in 
the creche case of County of Allegheny v. ACLU,83 and then again in 
the 2005 Ten Commandments case of Van Orden v. Perry.84  
All the same, most lines of establishment doctrine remained more 
firmly separationist. Because the Rehnquist Court remained hostile to 
the teaching of religious alternatives to evolution,85 it is not hard to 
imagine what the Court would have done with a law that, like the 
Northwest Ordinance, instructed public schools to teach religion as 
part of inculcating morality. Zelman itself made headway not by 
attacking Warren and Burger Court funding precedents directly, but 
by insisting that vouchers were different.86 In contrast to Allegheny 
and Van Orden, the Court declared unconstitutional a separate and 
more overtly-religious display of the Ten Commandments in 
McCreary County v. ACLU.87 Most notably, in the 1992 decision of 
 
 80. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 81. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 
(1997).  
 82. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 83. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
 84. 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005). 
 85. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (invalidating an attempt to 
support the teaching of creationism as an alternative to the Darwinian theory of evolution); see 
also Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (invalidating a 
program teaching intelligent design as an alternative to Darwinian evolution). 
 86. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649, 662–63. 
 87. 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/14
p349 Claeys book pages.doc  11/1/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006]  Justice Scalia and the Religion Clauses 365 
 
 
Lee v. Weisman, the Court rejected requests to reconsider 
separationist precedents so as to free public schools and other 
governmental bodies to foster school prayer.88 Taken together, these 
various developments suggest that the Rehnquist Court steered 
Establishment Clause doctrine toward the “non-preferentialism” view 
that then-Associate Justice Rehnquist advocated in Jaffree.89 But the 
Rehnquist Court embraced the non-preferential option only 
incompletely, and it in no way restored the Establishment Clause’s 
original meaning.  
Professor Epps’ valuable insights about Justice Scalia should thus 
not be taken out of proportion. Professor Epps makes Justice Scalia 
out to be the Rasputin of the Rehnquist Court’s five-vote moderate-
to-conservative wing: He is the “prophetic voice,”90 the “Court-
maker,”91 the field general whose “troops will storm the next walled 
city of separation.”92 In reality, the other moderate and conservative 
Justices, particularly O’Connor and Kennedy, had their own agendas. 
Indeed, it is telling that Professor Epps organizes much of his 
interpretation of the cases around Justice Scalia’s opinion in 
Weisman.93 That opinion was a dissent, and a particularly exasperated 
one. I find Epps more persuasive when he acknowledges that the 
“flood tide” might have come three years before Weisman, in 1989 in 
Smith.94 He also recognizes, as anyone must, that O’Connor’s 
“endorsement” test and Kennedy’s “coercion” test in Establishment 
cases preserved far more of the Warren and Burger Courts’ 
precedents than Scalia would have liked.95 If these insights are right 
(as I think they are), the logical question is why Scalia’s influence 
peaked in 1989 and ebbed steadily over the next sixteen years. 
I do not have a single answer to this question, but I can at least 
sketch the outlines of what I suspect is the complete answer. In 
 
 88. 505 U.S. 577, 586–87 (1992); accord Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 
(2000). 
 89. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 99 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 90. Epps, supra note 1, at 325. 
 91. Id. at 328. 
 92. Id. at 326. 
 93. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 94. Epps, supra note 1, at 328. 
 95. See id. at 328–30. 
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general, while Justice Scalia started many comprehensive 
constitutional interpretation debates that preoccupied the Rehnquist 
Court, he did not finish many of them. Justice Scalia’s story tracks, in 
large part, the debate among the Rehnquist Court about the conflict 
between the “original Constitution” and the “living Constitution.” As 
of 1985, “living Constitution” ideas held prominence in academic and 
political discussions of constitutional law.96 Even though Richard 
Nixon pledged in his presidential campaigns to nominate “strict 
constructionist” judges,97 and even though then-Associate Justice 
Rehnquist railed against the notion of a living Constitution,98 both 
advanced fairly extreme views in the climate between 1960 and 1980. 
Ronald Reagan invested considerable energy trying to change that 
climate. In 1987, Judge Robert Bork’s defeated nomination to the 
Supreme Court was in large part a raucous debate about the merits of 
the “original Constitution” and the “living Constitution.”99 Starting in 
1986, Reagan nominee Antonin Scalia contributed greatly to forcing 
this debate into the Rehnquist Court’s constitutional docket. He 
sparred with Justice Brennan—many would say to the point of losing 
a Court majority—about the legitimacy of living-Constitution 
substantive due process in the 1989 case of Michael H. v. Gerald 
D.100 Lee v. Weisman101 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey102 are two 
of the most revealing cases of the Rehnquist Court. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia tried to persuade their colleagues, 
especially recent Republican appointees O’Connor, Kennedy, and 
 
 96. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
2, 7 (1985) (“[T]he genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might have had 
in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with 
current problems and needs.”).  
 97. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV.  1787, 
1833 n.208 (2005). 
 98. See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 
(1976). 
 99. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW (1990). 
 100. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). Scalia announced the Court’s judgment in a plurality opinion. 
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy refrained from joining a footnote that proposed a tradition-
heavy approach to substantive due process, and Justice Stevens simply concurred in the 
judgment. 
 101. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 102. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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Souter, to reverse “living Constitution” precedents on school prayer 
and abortion. The latter three balked and sided with the Court’s 
liberals.  
This background offers a few lessons for considering Justice 
Scalia and the rest of the moderate-to-conservative majority. On one 
hand, there is a place for the original-versus-living Constitution 
debate as an organizing theme. It captured much of the debate in the 
first five years of the Rehnquist Court, and this debate still resonates 
in many leading book- and article-length retrospectives on the 
Rehnquist Court’s legacy.103 On the other hand, the originalist revival 
was rejected fairly decisively in 1992 in two climactic cultural and 
legal cases (Weisman on school prayer, and Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey on abortion),104 but the Rehnquist Court remained in business 
for another thirteen years. In this regard, I agree with L.A. Powe, Jr., 
and Mark Tushnet, who, (in Powe’s words) “in contrast to those who 
see revolution[, conclude] that the Court has done remarkably little of 
genuine importance” since.105  
A comprehensive retrospective must explain why Scalia and 
Rehnquist could not make common cause with Kennedy and 
O’Connor in an all-or-nothing debate such as Weisman, but could in 
many (though by no means all) of the nip-and-tuck debates after 
1992. I strongly suspect that two factors deserve special focus. First, 
in constitutional interpretation, Kennedy and O’Connor, in contrast to 
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, sympathize more with mainline 
academic views about the living Constitution than they do with the 
views of General Meese or originalist academics. Second, on the 
merits of religion debates, Kennedy and O’Connor sympathize more 
with elite separationist attitudes than to they do with grassroots 
religionist attitudes. The living-Constitution connection is obvious: 
When Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia attempted to 
overrule Roe in Casey, Kennedy and O’Connor co-authored the 
 
 103. See, e.g., THE REHNQUIST COURT, supra note 75; JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER 
HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE THE REHNQUIST COURT (pbk. ed. 1999); TINSLEY E. 
YARBROUGH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (2000); Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Forword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43 (1989). 
 104. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577; Casey, 505 U.S. 833. 
 105. L.A. Powe, Jr., The Not-So-Brave New Constitutional Order, 117 HARV. L. REV. 647, 
654 (2003) (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003)). 
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plurality opinion insisting that the Court’s substantive due process 
law builds on a historical tradition that is a “living thing. A decision 
of this Court which radically departs from it could not long 
survive.”106 
Kennedy and O’Connor used this general interpretive 
commitment to ratify separationist ideals in important cases. 
Kennedy supported some of the Court’s religionist tendencies in 
funding cases, but in Weisman he relied heavily on the “potential for 
divisiveness” theme to reaffirm that school-sponsored prayer 
unconstitutionally establishes religion.107 Meanwhile, in many 
concurrences, Justice O’Connor drew on separationist ideas to 
qualify her attachment to pro-funding cases.108 In Zelman, for 
example, O’Connor cited Everson approvingly to reaffirm that the 
“[First] Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations 
with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not 
require the state to be their adversary.”109 Professor Greene’s Article 
in this Symposium portrays Justice O’Connor similarly.110 
I have similar reservations about Professor Epps’ “Scalia as field 
general” thesis to the extent that it tries to explain the positions of 
Chief Justice Rehnquist or Justice Thomas. While I cannot explore 
this theme comprehensively here, I suspect it would be extremely 
interesting to track how the Rehnquist Court’s conservatives have 
developed religionist arguments in response to developments in the 
academy and among experienced lawyers. The religion cases 
illustrate an important limitation of the conservatives’ approach. 
Although they buck the academy and the inclinations of most public 
lawyers in many cases, the conservatives need help from the bar and 
academy to make sure that the contrarian positions they take are 
credible. Just as Robert Cord’s scholarship made it easier and more 
 
 106. Casey, 505 U.S. at 850 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari)). 
 107. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 587–88.  
 108. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 836 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring); 
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 622 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 109. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 669 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947)). 
 110. Abner S. Greene, The Apparent Consistency of Religion Clause Doctrine, 21 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 225 (2006). 
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respectable for then-Associate Justice Rehnquist to argue for non-
preferential funding in Jaffree,111 so subsequent scholarship 
encouraged Justice Thomas to question whether the Establishment 
Clause ought to be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment at 
all in Elk Grove School District v. Newdow.112 Thomas cited Akhil 
Amar on this point,113 and Steven Smith114 and V. Phillip Munoz,115 
among others, have defended similar results.  
Taking these various themes together, there is a richer and more 
interesting tale to tell about the moderate-to-conservative coalition on 
the Rehnquist Court. None of the other Justices are as impressionable 
as Epps suggests; most Justices form key interpretive or substantive 
commitments long before reaching the Court.116 Scalia’s equality-
neutrality argument was just one of several theories of religion and 
interpretation vying for control of the Court. Outflanking Scalia on 
the right, Justice Thomas pursued a more radical and more purely 
originalist approach in Newdow.117 Kennedy and O’Connor borrowed 
equality and neutrality themes (from Scalia and elsewhere) when 
such themes advanced their “separationist-lite” approach to religion 
cases. At the same time, neither Kennedy nor O’Connor was, and 
Kennedy is not now, bound to follow Scalia’s theories simply 
because they have conveniently relied on such theories from time to 
time.  
This portrait also helps explain how doctrinal change proceeds in 
the Supreme Court generally. Conservative political ideas became 
better respected in elite circles from the 1970s forward. Different 
wings of the Court’s moderate-to-conservative majority illustrated 
 
 111. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text. 
 112. 541 U.S. 1, 45 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 113. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 36–
39 (1998). 
 114. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 16, at 17–43. Smith believes that both 
religion clauses leave the states alone, whereas Thomas still prefers to incorporate the Free 
Exercise Clause.  
 115. Vincent Phillip Munoz, The Irrelevance of the Founding Fathers for, and the 
Impossibility of, an Incorporated Establishment Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 8 J. CONST. 
L. (forthcoming 2006). 
 116. “[I]n the field of economic and political philosophy there are not many who are 
influenced by new theories after they are twenty-five or thirty years of age.” JOHN MAYNARD 
KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 384 (1936). 
 117. Newdow, 541 U.S. at 45 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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different ways to accommodate them. O’Connor and Kennedy 
illustrated a gradualist and conventionalist approach. This approach 
allowed conservative ideas that had become respectable in the 1970s 
and 1980s, but it did not upset the Court’s general “living 
Constitution” approach. Such gradualism and conventionalism 
therefore continued to leave the Court free to borrow on broader 
social and intellectual trends to inform constitutional doctrine. At 
least in funding cases, O’Connor and Kennedy followed trends in 
elite and popular conservative thought by agreeing to give 
governments more leeway to support religious organizations on the 
same terms as non-religious organizations.118  
By contrast, Rehnquist and especially Scalia and Thomas 
preferred a more radical approach. They sought to undo the living-
Constitution theory and the substantive tendencies of the Warren and 
Burger Courts root and branch. To do so, they advocated a consistent 
legal response of originalism and judicial restraint. That approach 
was symbolized most by Weisman, which invited the Court to 
reconsider precedents restricting school prayer. If successful, their 
approach would have forced the Court to substantially limit its ability 
to draw on social and intellectual trends. From a conservative 
perspective, their approach was more systematic and ambitious—but 
it also risked rupturing a working conservative majority.  
This portrait also helps appreciate when and to what extent the 
Supreme Court responds to broader changes in the realm of ideas.119 
The originalism movement associated with Reagan, Meese, 
Rehnquist, Bork, and Scalia challenged Supreme Court interpretation 
more than anyone else had since 1937. Because this challenge was in 
large part theoretical, there was a great discrepancy between 
originalism’s ambitions and its results. It is difficult to transform the 
Court’s decision-making process quickly. When Presidents Reagan 
and H.W. Bush appointed Justices to the Court, there were not many 
committed originalists to choose from. Not all constituencies in their 
 
 118. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 119. For other attempts to explore this connection, see THOMAS MOYLAN KECK, THE 
MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL 
CONSERVATISM (2004); John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist 
Court’s Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485 (2002).  
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governing coalition placed high priority on originalism, and the 
constituencies that did lacked experience in identifying reliable 
originalists. As a result, while Reagan and Bush nominated two 
more-or-less consistent originalists (Thomas and, notwithstanding the 
qualifications in Part II, Justice Scalia), they also nominated three 
non-originalists (Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter). If these 
appointees were not close to conventional academic and precedential 
wisdom when appointed, they drifted toward that wisdom once 
confirmed and assured life tenure. Because so many of these 
appointees subscribed to elite attitudes about living Constitution 
interpretation and the separation of religion and politics, the 
Rehnquist Court’s originalists could only accomplish modest results 
in religion law.  
This gradualism may change, however, if conservative 
Republicans manage to appoint one or two more committed 
originalists. The originalism movement has gained respectability over 
the last three decades. There now exists a deeper pool of prospective 
originalist Justices. The Harriet Miers experience confirms that the 
Republican Party must nominate experienced originalists to satisfy its 
social and legal conservative constituencies. Those constituencies are 
more savvy and experienced at choosing nominees, and there exists a 
broader network of public intellectuals willing to defend originalism 
in constitutional law and religion in public life. At least by outward 
appearance, Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justice Samuel 
Alito both seem to be more thoroughgoing originalists and 
practitioners of judicial restraint than Justices O’Connor or Kennedy; 
their confirmations leave five living Constitutionalists and four 
originalists on the Roberts Court. Given one or two more committed 
originalists, and a network of originalist academics and intellectuals 
to encourage them and defend their work, Establishment Clause 
doctrine may change quite suddenly and dramatically.  
IV. EVALUATING THE REHNQUIST COURT’S RELIGION CASES 
Let us turn now from interpretation to law and policy. I hope to be 
brief here. All religious scholars can appreciate Professor Epps’ 
interpretive insights, and I have little to add to the debates that divide 
separationists and religionists. As a compromise, then, let me simply 
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suggest that Professor Epps has not satisfactorily considered 
attractive legal and normative arguments for the original meanings of 
the Religion Clauses.  
First, Epps criticizes the religionist tendencies in the Rehnquist 
Court’s religion cases by assuming that text, history, and policy all 
cut in favor of the separationist view.120 Pardon the pun, but I wonder 
whether Epps and other separationists need to make a choice between 
reason and authority. Curiously, and probably thanks to Everson and 
McCollum, the constitutional religion debate stresses history 
considerably more than the debates over many other individual-rights 
clauses.121 When Epps criticizes the religionist trends, I find his 
policy criticisms more convincing than his textual and historical 
criticisms. Rather than take my word for it, consider this 
development: In a review of Philip Hamburger’s book, Separation of 
Church and State, religion scholar Kent Greenawalt agreed that 
Hamburger “demolishes” the historical narrative associated with 
Jefferson’s vision of a “wall of separation,” and suggested instead 
that scholars consider whether separationist arguments are better 
grounded legally as the product of “normal evolutionary 
development.”122 In other words, Greenawalt agrees with Hamburger 
that Everson and McCollum do not accurately portray the history, and 
believes that it is more fruitful for scholars to embrace the living-
Constitution approach to legal doctrine advanced in Brennan’s 
Schempp concurrence.123 I have a similar reaction toward Professor 
Epps’ argument. 
Let us thus turn to questions of policy,124 which lead to my second 
reservation. In my view, Professor Epps understates the extent to 
 
 120. See, e.g., Epps, supra note 1, at 325 (“[N]ot even remotely tied to the text or history of 
the Religion Clauses.”). 
 121. A forthcoming symposium suggests that academics may be starting to reconsider this 
emphasis. See Symposium, The (Re)turn to History in Religion Clause Law and Scholarship, 81 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).  
 122. Kent Greenawalt, History as Ideology: Philip Hamburger’s Separation of Church and 
State, 93 CAL. L. REV. 367, 368–69 (2005) (reviewing HAMBURGER, supra note 8). 
 123. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. 
 124. Here, of course, originalists like me may want to stop reading. But I assume here that 
most readers will want to know about the policy. And originalists may want to keep reading 
anyway, if only to consider why it might not be a good idea to amend the Religion Clauses 
along lines amenable to Professor Epps. 
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which federalism and separation of powers can diminish many of the 
problems with which he is concerned. Cases such as McCreary, 
Weisman, and the Everson-McCollum pair are offensive to many 
religious citizens. In such cases, blue-state judges make blue-state 
assumptions about religion the law of the land, in all states both blue 
and red. Whatever its limitations, federalism frees separationists to 
leave red states for blue, and religionists free to leave blue states for 
red.  
Separation of powers also applies as between federal courts and 
the political branches in the states. Religious accommodations are a 
delicate business, and the compromise they require is often associated 
more with politicians than with lawyers. Following these concerns 
through, Scalia’s arguments in Smith and Weisman make 
considerable sense: It is better for courts to confess that questions 
about public worship and religious exemptions require difficult 
choices, to enforce the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses only 
against core violations, and to leave raucous cultural fights and 
imperfect compromises to local political processes. Readers 
interested in such arguments may consider the writings of Steven 
Smith,125 Richard Garnett,126 Mark Rosen,127 and Robert Nagel,128 
among others. 
Professor Epps finds such prudential and comparative-institutional 
arguments unconvincing, of course. He believes that a fully 
“sophisticated, psychological view of coercion would limit many 
majority practices that might be permitted under a formalistic test that 
required legal penalty before a government practice crossed the 
Establishment Clause line.”129 He also believes that the same reading 
provides anti-discrimination protections to religious minorities 
 
 125. See SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 16. 
 126. Richard W. Garnett IV, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2006) (manuscript available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=855104). 
 127. Mark D. Rosen, Establishment, Expressivism, and Federalism, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
669 (2003). 
 128. See ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2001). Although 
Nagel does not treat our cultural politics over religion, the criticisms he makes of the 
nationalization of intimacy and politics generally apply equally to the nationalization of 
religion. See id. at 133–65.  
 129. Epps, supra note 1, at 330. 
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similar to those that the civil rights movement provided to racial and 
ethnic minorities.130  
Here lie my deepest differences with Professor Epps. Professor 
Epps’ “sophisticated, psychological” argument captures many 
tendencies typical of “living Constitution” renditions of the Religion 
Clauses. Such arguments can be questionable when and to the extent 
that they tempt us to claim that “we” are wiser as a people solely on 
the ground that we have more technical and professional expertise 
than we had 200 years ago. Technical progress is not the same as 
moral or political progress. We may be more proficient at measuring 
concrete psychological effects in specific people, but that very 
proficiency may lead us to overconfidently understate or forget the 
more general and comprehensive psychological insights one can learn 
from good literature, religion, or political philosophy. By the same 
token, Epps’ analogies to the civil rights movement beg the most 
important question. No one chooses his or her skin color, and skin 
color need not determine one’s character or outlook on basic moral 
and political questions. By contrast, religion is divisive in large part 
because different religions answer those moral and political questions 
differently, and because those choices have real consequences for 
citizens’ character and our collective culture.  
Since at least Everson and McCollum, two different versions of 
liberalism have presented two competing visions of the role that 
organized religion ought to play in American public life. Epps 
assumes rather than demonstrates one of those versions—the one that 
follows Everson and McCollum. This view (in Hamburger’s portrait) 
is “drawn from European experiences and fears,” which worries that 
“the clerical and creedal religion of most churches appear[s] to 
threaten the individual equality and mental freedom [deemed] 
essential for the citizens of a republic.”131 If the mistake the lawgiver 
is most determined to avoid is eighteenth-century European throne-
and-altar dynasticism, he will quite naturally try to foster a secular 
public square and to make the model citizen the secular and 
university-trained professional. This view accentuates the dangers to 
politics, and the psychological harms to non-believers and dissenters, 
 
 130. See id. at 339. 
 131. HAMBURGER, supra note 8, at 490; see also NOVAK, supra note 22. 
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presented when religious believers inject professions of faith into 
public life. 
By contrast, other Americans’ views on politics and religion are 
informed by a more classical-liberal understanding. They may be 
shaped by parts of American culture conditioned by Locke, 
Tocqueville, and the experiences of most American Founders, or by 
similar teachings propagated by the post-Vatican II Catholic 
Church132 and other contemporary religions committed to religious 
pluralism. For these citizens, the religious reformer is a leading 
citizen. For them, America cannot have a healthy political or cultural 
atmosphere without a strong common morality, and there cannot be a 
strong common morality without a religious public square.133 For 
these citizens, modern Religion Clauses doctrine takes a risky 
gamble: It bets that the law can protect non-believers and dissenters 
from hurt feelings without draining the social and moral capital on 
which vigorous democracy rests.  
To give just one defense of this view, let me conclude by briefly 
explaining Tocqueville’s defense of the American compromise. 
Tocqueville was definitely sensitive to the danger that religion may 
create temptations to political tyranny. “Allow the human mind to 
follow its tendency,” he acknowledged, “and it will regulate political 
society and the divine city in a uniform manner; it will seek, if I dare 
say it, to harmonize the earth with Heaven.”134 At the same time, 
liberalism, democracy, and republicanism all create tremendous 
temptations toward political license. That prospect convinced 
Tocqueville to reject the views of eighteenth-century philosophes 
who expected that “[r]eligious zeal [would] be extinguished as 
freedom and enlightenment increase.”135 Tocqueville, like 
contemporary religionists and contrary to contemporary 
separationists, agreed with the sense behind the saying, “When a man 
stops believing in God he doesn’t believe in nothing, he believes 
anything.”136 “How could society fail to perish,” Tocqueville thus 
 
 132. See Pope Paul VI, supra note 28; see also MURRAY, supra note 28. 
 133. See, e.g., RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1984). 
 134. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 11, I.ii.9, at 275. 
 135. Id. at 282. 
 136. Although this saying is often attributed to G.K. Chesterton, it is probably apocryphal. 
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worried, “if, while the political bond is relaxed, the moral bond were 
not tightened.” Tocqueville thought religion an essential element to 
shoring up that morality: “[W]hat makes a people master of itself if it 
has not submitted to God?”137  
Tocqueville praised America because it had mediated this tension. 
One important part of the solution was to foster respect for religion, 
and especially for sects and denominations that inculcate the basic 
lessons of equality, dignity, and morality that a liberal and democratic 
republic needs. In this regard, Tocqueville observed, America was 
fortunate to have been “peopled by men who, after having escaped 
the authority of the pope, did not submit to any religious supremacy,” 
and “therefore brought to the New World a Christianity that I cannot 
depict better than to call it democratic and republican.”138 Such 
denominations reinforced lessons of morality and equality by 
“intermingl[ing] all classes of society at the foot of the same altar, as 
they are intermingled in the eyes of God.”139 (Since Epps is quick to 
cite the civil rights movement as moral authority, he should consider 
how it would have fared if it had not been staffed largely with 
believers who held that racial equality was a necessary corollary of 
human equality before a common Lord.) 
The other part of the solution is to strike a compromise as to how 
religion can influence political life—to make it “less powerful” 
temporally, but with “influence . . . more lasting” in its rightful 
sphere.140 On one hand, anti-establishment laws, free-exercise 
guarantees, and a broad political consensus for toleration should all 
keep religion from taking an official role in political life. On the other 
hand, religion should elevate political life through the backdoor, by 
“direct[ing] mores, and [by] regulating the family . . . to regulate the 
state.”141 This compromise protects religion from becoming bogged 
 
See Letter from Dale Ahlquist to Richard John Neuhaus (Dec. 31, 2005) (available at 
http://www.firstthings.com/onthesquare/?p135&pageid=25). 
 137. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 11, at 282. 
 138. Id. at 275.  
 139. Id. at 276. Tocqueville speaks in this passage specifically of Catholicism, but he does 
so both to illustrate how Catholicism could be reconciled with democracy when shorn of its 
temporal pretensions, and to highlight the religious teachings that reinforce respect for 
democracy. 
 140. Id. at 286. 
 141. Id. at 278. 
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down in temporal politics and corruption. Conversely, it also protects 
politics: While it prevents politics from becoming bogged down in 
debates over “the worship one must render to the Creator,” it lets the 
state and different sects shore up the community’s views on “the 
duties of men toward one another” and “the same morality in the 
name of God.”142  
If this analysis of the democratic citizen’s soul is sensible, it 
would be unfortunate to use anti-establishment guarantees to limit 
religion’s role in American public life. Of course, there may be ways 
to preserve the goods of America’s religious tradition while avoiding 
many of the bads that most concern Professor Epps. But this is a far 
more delicate business than he lets on. I am not at all convinced that 
the wall of separation of which he is so fond does the job.  
 
 142. Id.  
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